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In Turkey, electricity and water expenses 
for houses of prayer, such as mosques 
and churches, are covered by the state. 
Cemevis, places of worship for Turkey’s 
marginalized religious community of 
Alevis, however, cannot benefit from this 
regulation. By analyzing the political 
negotiations between the Turkish state 
and Alevis about cemevis’ utility bills, this 
article argues that unequal distribution of 
infrastructural funds becomes a means for 
governing religion in urban contexts. In 
so doing, I focus on a less studied dimen-
sion of infrastructures by examining how 
infrastructural governance is an arena 
both to reproduce and to contest hege-
monic state religiosity.
Keywords: Infrastructure, religion, state, 
religious minorities, electricity and water.
Introduction
On a rainy Istanbul day in December 2014, 
the meeting hall of the Yenibosna Cemevi, 
a place of worship for Turkey’s marginal-
ized Alevi religious community, was 
packed with excited dedes, Alevi religious 
leaders. They had travelled to Istanbul’s 
Yenibosna neighborhood from various 
other cemevis across Turkey, together with 
journalists from Turkey’s major news net-
works in order to attend the press declara-
tion of the Cem Foundation, a major Alevi 
civil society organization. The panel of 
Cem Foundation representatives facing 
the curious audience was detailing the 
recent European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) decision on the status of cemevis 
in Turkey. Turkish law declares that elec-
tricity and water expenses for houses of 
prayer, such as mosques, synagogues, 
and churches are paid by the state bud-
get.1 Cemevis, however, cannot benefit 
from this regulation, as the state does not 
recognize cemevis as places of worship. 
Upon the case filed by the Cem 
Foundation, however, the ECHR ruled 
against the Turkish state’s practice and 
ordered that cemevis were places of wor-
ship similar to mosques, churches, and 
synagogues so their electricity and water 
expenses should be covered from the 
state budget. After the representatives fin-
ished their prepared remarks, a dede from 
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the crowd, in a voice trembling with excite-
ment, asked the one question everyone 
was curious about: “Was the Turkish state 
going to comply with the ruling?” 
Drawing on the current controversies over 
who should pay for the utilities of cemevis 
in Turkey, this article examines how 
unequal distribution of the state’s infra-
structural budget becomes a means for 
both reinforcing and contesting religious 
hierarchies in urban contexts. Although 
the Turkish constitution defines the state 
as secular, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, (the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs, hereafter 
the Diyanet), a major state institution 
founded in 1924, establishes the hege-
mony of Sunni Islam in the country with its 
massive budget that only sponsors Sunni 
Islamic practice. As a community that has 
major religious differences from Sunni 
Muslims, Alevis have been marginalized 
for decades by this state-sponsored hege-
mony of Sunni Islam.2 Unlike Sunni 
Muslims, the majority of Alevis “do not 
abide by the “pillars of Islam”: they do not 
make the pilgrimage to Mecca, do not 
perform the daily prayers (namaz), and do 
not fast during the Ramadan” (Es 23). The 
community prays in cemevis, which are 
named after their major ritual Cem.
Although the legal status of cemevis 
became a major arena of negotiation 
between the state and the Alevi commu-
nity in the 1990s, in the 2000s the discus-
sions around cemevis increasingly cen-
tered on their utility bill sponsorship. This 
focus on utility bills has in part emerged as 
a way around the Diyanet’s refusal to rec-
ognize cemevis as places of worship. The 
Diyanet defines its own rendition of Sunni 
Islam as impartial and objective, and 
hence as being inclusive of all variations 
within Islam. Under this framework, 
Alevism is considered an Islamic variation 
and Alevis are defined as already included 
Muslims (Shakman Hurd 418, Dressler 190). 
Considering the mosque as the single 
place of worship for all Muslims, the 
Diyanet and (hence) the state representa-
tives resisted Alevis’ demands for official 
recognition of cemevis, on the grounds 
that Alevis do not need a second place of 
worship (mosques being the first).3
Drawing on this consistent refusal to grant 
place of worship status to cemevis, this 
article unravels how the state in Turkey 
attempts to manage the cemevis’ recogni-
tion problem by reducing it to a mere 
issue of economic distribution, ignoring 
the religious, social, and political inequali-
ties that created such a situation in the first 
place. The discussions about a recent 
reform attempt in 2014 directed at Alevis, 
an attempt that in fact was not put in 
action, revealed this situation in a striking 
manner. In order to reform Alevis’ status, 
the government proposed to expand the 
law that covers the utility expenses of 
places of worship to include cemevis. 
While doing so, however, the officials also 
suggested a distinction between a place 
of worship and a prayer room and catego-
rized cemevis under the latter. Even 
though not actualized, this suggestion 
showed that the government considered 
covering the electricity and water 
expenses of cemevis from the state bud-
get as an alternative way to avoid legally 
recognizing cemevis as places of worship. 
In so doing, it attempted to reduce the 
demands about cemevis’ legal status into 
a mere utility bill problem in ways that pre-
vented Alevis having an equal footing with 
Sunni Muslims. 
Whereas the government tried to utilize 
utility bill sponsorship to avoid recogniz-
ing cemevis as places of worship, Alevi 
activists, however, promoted the idea that 
utility coverage was in fact a way of claim-
ing cemevis as places of worship. After the 
government did not go forward with its 
suggested reform plan in 2014, Alevis 
stopped paying for cemevis’ utility 
expenses as a counter political strategy to 
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highlight their status as places of worship. 
As the state refrained from financing infra-
structural expenses, views about how to 
cover cemevis’ electricity and water 
expenses came to express more strongly 
whether or not one considered cemevis 
places of worship especially for opposi-
tional political actors. 
This article focuses on such religious con-
sequences of infrastructural governance—
a rather less studied dimension of infra-
structural research—and argues that the 
discussions surrounding the distribution 
of the state’s infrastructural budget are a 
contentious political arena in which reli-
gious hierarchies are forged and con-
tested in urban contexts. Recent ethno-
graphic work highlights how the 
generation, distribution, and consump-
tion of electricity and water, together with 
disruptions in any of these steps, both 
reinforce and challenge modes of state 
governance (Larkin 327, Anand 542, Von 
Schnitzler 20, Collier 23, Limbert 26, 
Schwenkel 520, Mains 3, Gupta 555, and 
Harvey 76). Although this literature ana-
lyzes how such governance reproduces 
class-based hierarchies, the question of 
how infrastructural management pro-
duces religious hierarchies is rarely exam-
ined. Drawing on and moving beyond 
these scholarly discussions, I suggest that 
the state’s infrastructural budget also 
undergirds a strategy of religious gover-
nance, rendering certain religiosities 
legitimate in the urban context while dis-
crediting others. Therefore, in what fol-
lows, I examine the utility bills of cemevis 
in an urban setting in Turkey as a “prob-
lematic materiality” (Schwenkel 521) that 
is both a signifier of a group’s position in 
the hierarchically organized realm of reli-
gion and a ground to contest state gover-
nance—a ground that feeds into the for-
mation of counter-hegemonic political 
action (Coleman 458).4
Alevis in the Cities: Emergence of Cemevis 
and Alevis’ Political Demands
Constituting approximately 15-25 percent 
of the population, Alevis compose Turkey’s 
second largest faith community after 
Sunni Muslims. Although Alevis do not 
define themselves as Shia Muslims, the 
community strongly identifies with Imam 
Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of 
Mohammad, and with the Karbala para-
bles. Ayin-i cem or cem is at the heart of 
the Alevi belief. It “functions as a rite of 
initiation for adolescents, as a commemo-
ration ritual for revered figures in early 
Islamic history [such as Ali], and as a site 
for the adjudication of social disputes 
among members of the community” 
(Tambar 655). The frequency and the tim-
ing of its conduct vary among different 
Alevi groups, as well as its duration—some 
cem ceremonies can last for hours. Lead 
by a dede, the ceremony is “structured 
around a set of practices called the twelve 
services,” which, in a certain order, include 
rites, such as, saluting the dede, lighting 
candles, and turning semah—a dance that 
consists of the whirling of men and women 
participants in circular form, accompanied 
by music played by bağlama (Öztürkmen 
252).  
Cemevis, which literally mean “a house for 
cem or union” in Turkish, are products of 
the urbanization the community has expe-
rienced since the 1950s, when massive 
industrialization resulted in a wave of 
urban migration in Turkey (Tambar 23, 
Massicard 27, Yalçınkaya 19). Having 
mostly lived in predominantly Alevi vil-
lages until then, Alevis used to “gather in 
the houses of dedes or one of the com-
munity members,” although lodges and 
shrines were sometimes used as places for 
cem ceremonies (Es 28). Alevis founded 
cemevis in the cities partly because the 
smaller rooms of apartment buildings 
were not large enough for the cem gather-
ing. In time, cemevis became the major 
centers for reproducing Alevi sociality in 
the urban contexts. They served as sites 
for not only carrying out essential commu-
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nal services such as funerals and sacrifices 
but also for organizing a wide array of 
social and political activities—from com-
puter and English classes to panels on 
Alevi problems. 
As the number of cemevis in İstanbul 
alone increased from 3 in 1993 to 64 in 
2013 (Seufert 163, T24, 15 March 2013), 
they “have gradually become established 
as “cultural centers,” which is the only via-
ble legal status a cemevi can possibly 
attain” in contemporary Turkey (Es 32). 
This official classification is another way for 
maintaining the Sunni-centered descrip-
tion of Alevism as an Islamic variation. 
According to Ali Bardakoğlu, the former 
president of the Diyanet, although cemevi 
and mosque existed together in Turkey’s 
history, “the mosque existed as a place of 
worship, while cemevis were places of cul-
ture (kültür evleri) in which the traditions 
of a group within Islam flourished” (Tambar 
662). Legal recognition of cemevis as 
places of worship emerged in response to 
this official approach to cemevis as cul-
tural centers.
 
Recognition of cemevis, however, is part 
of a series of other demands by the rising 
Alevi movement since the 1990s that aim 
to prevent the marginalization of the com-
munity in not only religious but also social, 
economic, and political terms. This multi-
faceted marginalization culminated in 
massacres such as the Sivas Massacre of 
1993, in which Sunni Islamist mobs burned 
33 attendees of an Alevi festival to death, 
and the Gazi Events of 1995, which resulted 
in the death of 23 individuals during the 
protests in an Alevi neighborhood. 
Besides igniting violence, unequal treat-
ment at times has taken the form of a glass 
ceiling preventing Alevis from reaching 
high-ranking state jobs. Moreover, various 
other forms of daily discrimination have 
pushed members of the community to 
hide their identity in public.5 In order to 
prevent similar massacres and to achieve 
equal public footing, Alevi activists called 
for the abolition or the reformation of the 
obligatory religious classes in schools that 
only teach Sunni Islam, the provision of 
equal employment opportunities to Alevis 
in state and private sector jobs, the aboli-
tion or reformation of the Diyanet, and the 
provision of equal citizenship rights prom-
ised by the secular constitution. 
Cemevis, Utility Bills, and Urban Religious 
Governance 
In 2009, the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi (Justice and Development Party, 
hereafter AKP) government started a pro-
cess named the Alevi Initiative (Alevi 
Açılımı), which consisted of a series of 
meetings between AKP officials and Alevi 
representatives. Although the purpose of 
these meetings was to address Alevis’ 
demands, the initiative, which lasted for 
almost a year, ended in 2010 with no tan-
gible changes in legal policy (Lord 2). In 
the following years, the government 
revived reform attempts, especially during 
politically critical periods such as elec-
tions, and mainstream media presented 
such attempts as in continuity with this ini-
tial period of “Alevi Initiatives.” These sub-
sequent reform attempts are important 
sites to examine how the state officials aim 
to address the “Alevi problem” in a reduc-
tionist way, which ignores the major 
expectation informing the community’s 
demands: achieving an equal and, more 
importantly, a secure public footing. 
During the periods preceding the general 
elections, with the hopes of attracting 
Alevi votes, the government consistently 
brought the issue of cemevis’ electricity 
and water expenses to public attention 
with promises of reforming the commu-
nity’s status. Similarly, in October 2014, 
approximately eight months before the 
upcoming June 7 elections in 2015, then-
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu men-
tioned that he was working with his team 
on a new reform process targeting Alevi 
citizens with details soon to be announced.
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As revealed in officials’ public statements 
and articles published on pro-state news 
media outlets, this recent reform project 
specifically targeted granting some form 
of official status to cemevis (A Haber, 23 
Oct. 2014). According to an article in the 
pro-state newspaper Yeni Şafak, the prime 
minister and his team had two plans for 
reforming the status of cemevis both 
related to infrastructural support (Yeni 
Şafak, 13 Nov. 2014). The first plan was to 
cover the electricity expenses of cemevis 
from the state budget. The article pointed 
to a relatively new cabinet decree issued 
in April 2002 which stated that “the elec-
tricity expenses of the places of worship 
(mosques, prayer rooms, churches, and 
synagogues) are to be covered” from the 
state budget. The team was working on an 
amendment to this decree to include 
cemevis. The second plan was to execute 
the same decree to cover cemevis’ water 
expenses.
There was no word, however, either in the 
article published in the pro-state newspa-
per or in the public statements of the 
prime minister about recognizing cemevis 
as places of worship. A statement of Prime 
Minister Davutoğlu revealed the reasons 
of this silence:
We are now working on the legal status 
of cemevis. There is a […] trend […] to 
organize Alevism as a separate religi-
on. They see no difference between a 
cemevi and a church, a synagogue, or 
a mosque. We are looking for a formu-
la that is different than this (Milliyet, 10 
Nov. 2014).
This statement openly underlines that the 
government was willing to finance ceme-
vis’ utility costs as long as such coverage 
would not also confer the status of a place 
of worship on cemevis. His words high-
light the concern that a laxly crafted legal 
formula that grants cemevis a share from 
the state budget could simultaneously 
assign the faith the status of a religion 
similar to other recognized religions. Such 
recognition would then be in contradic-
tion with official claims about the objectiv-
ity and inclusivity of state Islam vis-à-vis 
Alevism. The legal formula that would allo-
cate some of the state’s infrastructural 
funds to cemevis, therefore, must be 
crafted in such a way that it would not 
leave any room for equating cemevis with 
mosques, synagogues, and churches—a 
rendition, in the official articulations, that 
could open the way for depictions of 
Alevism as a similarly equal religion.
Another news article more openly 
revealed that such reduction was a way for 
reinforcing, rather than dismantling, the 
prevalence of Sunni Islam (A Haber, 23 
Oct. 2014). While covering the utility bills 
of cemevis from the state budget, the offi-
cials were planning to propose a distinc-
tion between a mabet (temple) and an 
ibadet yeri (prayer room) to clarify the 
legal status of cemevis. With this classifica-
tion, the description went, the mosque 
would remain the single temple of all 
Muslims and its superior status would not 
be open to debate. Cemevis then could 
be considered prayer rooms. As stated in 
the article, the idea behind this distinction 
was that “every religion has only one tem-
ple that is the mosque for Islam but 
Muslims can pray in different places such 
as cemevis (Müslümanlar cemevi gibi 
farklı yerlerde ibadet edebilirler).” This was 
the suggested political formula that would 
grant legal status to cemevis as prayer 
rooms in a way that would not jeopardize 
the mosque’s position as the only place of 
worship for all Muslims. This distinction 
maintained the idea that the mosque was 
Alevis’ place of worship too, even if they 
preferred to pray in cemevis which had an 
inferior status as prayer rooms. Cemevis 
thus were by no means an equivalent to 
the mosques in this formulation.
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By the end of November 2014, Davutoğlu 
made a public declaration to list the steps 
included in the Alevi reform package 
(Hürriyet, 23 Nov. 2014). Despite promises 
about covering the utility expenses of 
cemevis, his public address did not men-
tion any of these plans. The prime minis-
ter’s speech that day revealed that a legal 
formula that would guarantee cemevis a 
share from the state’s infrastructural bud-
get without recognizing them as places of 
worship was simply not possible. The pre-
ceding debates over how to cover ceme-
vis’ utility bills, however, showed how the 
state attempted to address the “cemevi 
problem” by breaking it down into the 
components of economic and religious 
demands. For the government, meeting 
the economic demand could only be pos-
sible as long as the demand for equal 
treatment in the religious realm could be 
isolated. Even if not executed, this plan, 
therefore, aimed to reinforce, rather than 
demolish, religious hierarchies. 
Utility Bill Debates and the Possibilities of 
Counter-Politics
The announcement of the ECHR decision 
about the electricity and water expenses 
of cemevis in December 2014 coincided 
with the aftermath of Davutoğlu’s reform 
statement.6 The co-occurrence of these 
two conflicting developments, the Turkish 
government refusing, once again, to rec-
ognize cemevis while the ECHR conferring 
such recognition, rendered the utility bills 
a political hot topic. Emboldened partly 
by the ECHR decision, various cemevis 
across Turkey started a civil disobedience 
movement and stopped paying their elec-
tricity and water expenses. Moreover, the 
oppositional Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 
(Republican People’s Party–CHP) and 
Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples' 
Democracy Party–HDP) announced that 
their municipalities would cover cemevis’ 
utility bills—in an attempt to recognize 
cemevis as places of worship despite the 
state’s refusal.
These actions aimed to counter the reduc-
tionist approach of the government by 
endowing cemevis’ utility bill coverage 
with even more political, religious, and 
affective significance and potential. By not 
paying or not charging cemevis’ infra-
structural costs, these activists and parties 
reinforced the idea that positions about 
the payment of utility bills were in fact a 
way of attributing place of worship status 
to cemevis. If the government abstained 
from covering cemevis’ utility bills so as 
not to confirm this status as places of wor-
ship, with their counter political actions, 
Alevi activists and oppositional political 
parties turned the utility bill payments into 
a strong political reaffirmation of cemevis’ 
status as places of worship. In so doing, 
they highlighted that the sponsorship of 
cemevis’ infrastructural expenses cannot 
be isolated from demands for religious 
equality. 
  
Endowing utility bill payments with such 
political significance was a culmination of 
prior political actions taken by parties and 
activists. In 2008, for instance, the parlia-
ments of Kuşadası and Didim municipali-
ties, which were then run by CHP, recog-
nized cemevis as places of worship. The 
first action they took after this decision 
was not receiving payment for the water 
expenses of cemevis. In 2011, a major Alevi 
association, Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür ve 
Dayanışma Derneği, organized one of the 
most creative protests in reaction to the 
unofficial status of cemevis. A group of Pir 
Sultan members broke down the electric-
ity and water meters they brought to 
İstanbul’s famous Taksim Square in order 
to highlight that cemevis are places of 
worship similar to mosques, synagogues, 
and churches. These actions reinforced 
the idea that positions about utility costs 
communicated views about cemevis’ 
place of worship status.  
In order to counter the protests following 
the 2014 reform attempt, the government 
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began to cancel electricity and water ser-
vices of cemevis due to their unpaid bal-
ance. This action imbued utility services 
with more religious significance. On March 
23, 2015, for instance, Garip Dede Cemevi 
in Istanbul received a notice that their 
water service had been cancelled due to 
their 2232 Turkish Liras (~630 USD) worth 
of unpaid water bills. Members of several 
Alevi associations immediately gathered 
in front of the cemevi to protest this execu-
tion. During the protest, Rıza Eroğlu, the 
president of Alevi Dernekler Federasyonu 
(The Federation of Alevi Associations), 
stated that “they left Imam Hüseyin go 
without water in Karbala and now they are 
leaving us go without water in cemevis 
(Kerbelada İmam Hüseyin’i susuz bıraktılar 
burada cemevinde de bizleri).” By estab-
lishing a historical continuity between the 
contemporary moment and Imam Ali’s son 
Hüseyin’s murder during the 7th century 
Karbala Battle, Alevi activists reinforce the 
idea that cemevis’ utility bill demands can-
not be reduced to a mere issue of eco-
nomic distribution. These demands carry 
a history of marginalization and unequal 
treatment within themselves.         
These political reactions in the wake of the 
ECHR decision and failed reform highlight 
how forms of state governance forged by 
infrastructural transformations open up 
new spaces for collective action “in terms 
beyond their actual material organization” 
(Coleman 460, my emphasis). In this sense, 
controversies over who must pay for 
cemevis’ utility bills not only reinforced 
existing religious hierarchies in the urban 
space. They also created a new political 
arena to contest such hierarchies. 
Conclusion
Since the foundation of this country, in 
fact since the Ottoman times, we are an 
essential part of this land but we could 
never have our rights. We still have to 
pay for the electricity and water ex-
penses of our cemevis. They do not 
charge mosques for those expenses 
but they charge us! What else can I say 
(April 2015, Personal Interview).
These are the words of an Alevi man in his 
fifties, describing how he feels excluded in 
his own country. Although he is not an 
active member of either an Alevi associa-
tion or a cemevi, the electricity and water 
expenses of cemevis is one of the first 
things that crosses his mind when he 
describes his marginalization. The dispar-
ity in how the state allocates its infrastruc-
tural budget among different religious 
communities, therefore, not only turns the 
debates about infrastructures into an 
arena of religious governance and nego-
tiation; it also informs how individuals con-
struct their religious identites as minori-
tized. In this sense, “ordinary” Alevis’ 
conceptions of themselves as Alevis and 
their self-understanding of their place in 
the society emerge partly amid such con-
tentions around “who should pay for the 
utility expenses of cemevis in Turkey.” In 
Turkey and elsewhere, therefore, infra-
structural allocation becomes a technique 
of modern governments to cultivate reli-
giously marginalized identities. The 
inequalities informing such allocation are 
devices through which citizens imagine 
both their identities and their states as a 
religiously marked one.
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3 There is an ongoing 
discussion about how to 
define Alevism in relation 
to Islam, a debate that also 
informs questions about 
whether or not cemevis 
are Islamic. Although the 
majority of Alevis define 
themselves as Muslims, 
their identification with 
Islam is in tension with the 
state’s overall portrayal of 
Alevis as already included 
Muslims. As the state uses 
this blanket description of 
Alevis as Muslims to discredit 
the community’s demands 
for legal recognition, 
Alevis’ and cemevis’ 
relation to Islam needs to 
be articulated carefully, by 
paying special attention to 
the tension between the 
state’s articulation of Alevis as 
Muslims and Alevis’ very own 
identifications with Islam.
4 I collected the data used 
in this article during my 
dissertation fieldwork at 
the newsrooms of major 
Alevi television networks in 
İstanbul from September 
2014 to January 2016. In 
addition to participant 
observation, I also conducted 
in-depth interviews with 
both activist and non-activist 
Alevis and collected news 
articles about Alevis from 
the archives of major news 
outlets in Turkey.
Notes
1 This is a relatively new 
cabinet decree [#2002/4100 
– 2(f)] that was issued in April 
2002 as part of the European 
Union (EU) accession reforms. 
The decree states that “the 
electricity expenses of the 
places of worship (mosques, 
prayer rooms, churches, 
and synagogues) are to 
be covered by the Diyanet 
budget.”
2 Although Alevis’ 
marginalization dates back to 
the Ottoman Empire period, 
this paper limits its analysis to 
the Turkish Republican era.
5 One such daily 
discrimination is the 
prejudiced renditions of cem 
ceremony that accuses the 
community of engaging in 
incest during the ritual.
6 The ECHR rulings are 
binding for Turkey according 
to mutually signed 
agreements. Although 
Turkey implements some of 
the court’s decisions, there 
are politically contentious 
cases wherein the state 
ignores ECHR rulings, as 
with the cemevi decision. 
In 2013, Turkey was ranked 
second after Italy in not 
implementing the ECHR 
decisions, with 1241 
unimplemented decisions 
out of 2400 finalized cases 
(Hürriyet 5 March 2013).
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